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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
ELSIE ROACH, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
JOHN KYREMES, 
Defendant and A'(p1pellant. 
APPELLAN·T 'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Case No. 
7315 
This action arose out of a collision between appel-
lant's car and the plaintiff while she was walking along 
Redwood Road on a dark and stormy evening on No-
vember 7, 1947. 
The plaintiff in her .complaint charged that on the 
evening of November 7, 1947, she alighted from a street 
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car at 21st South and Redwood Road ''and no sidewalks 
being available, began to make her way along the 'vest 
shoulder, of the pavement, of Redwood Road, walking 
in a southerly direction," and that defendant, who was 
driving an automobile in a southerly direction, struck 
her. 
The main facts in this case are without dispute. It 
ap·pears that s~ortly after seven o'clock P. M. of said 
day, plaintiff and another young lady were vvalking 
towards their home in a southerly direction along Red-
wood Road, south of 21st South Street. It was dark and 
stormy, visibility was very poor. The defendant was 
driving a 1936 Plymouth car in the same direction and 
at the time of the collision he was driving to his home. 
Plaintiff was 23 years of age, wore an artificial right 
leg, the leg having been amputated about ten years 
prior to the accident on account of a bone infection. 
There was a sidewalk for the use of pedestrians on the 
easterly side of the highway which lead to pJaintiff 's 
home. Redwood R·oad is a paved highway, 38 feet, 6 
inches wide, paved with black top, with gravel shoulders 
on each side. 
The plaintiff's own evidence shows that she was 
struck by defendant at a point of more than five feet 
east of the west edge of the highway. Her companion 
was also struck and she came to rest in the center lane 
of the highway. In other words, plaintiff was struck in 
the lane normally used by automobiles in traveling along 
the highway. Defendant did not see plaintiff until after 
he struck her. He was going app-roximately 20 miles 
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an hour at the time of the impact and stopped his auto-
Inobile ''ithin 15 feet. Plaintiff and her companion 
testified that ears \Yere 'passing ·up and down the high-
\Yay and that they did not see or hear plaintiff's auto-
mobile. Plaintiff's artificial leg was bent and slightly 
damaged and she suffered minor injuries. 
ASSIGNMEN'T OF ERRO·Rs 
RELIED UPON FOR REVERSAL 
The ap~pellant assigns the following errors for re-
versal: 
1. That plaintiff was guilty of contributory negli-
gence. 
2. That the court failed to charge the jury as to 
the relative rights of the parties to the use of the high-
\vay. 
3. Court's instruction No. 11 is erroneous and not 
the law. 
4. ·Court's instruction No. 12 is argumentative, 
prejudicial and an invasion of the province of the jury 
by assuming facts that were not admitted. 
5. The Court erred in refusing to give defendant's 
requested instructions No. 4, 5, and 6. 
ARGUMENT 
- ,Pt:!)./N f- ~-
The Court's instruction number 11 is erroneous in 
that it fails to fu.lly state the law and the relativ-e rights 
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of 1automobile drivers and pedestrians using the high-
way, as under the. circumstances plaintiff was guilty of 
contributory negligence. 
It is contended by the appellant that under the cir-
cumstances of this case, the plaintiff was guilty of con-
tributory negligence in walking in the lane of the por-
tion used by automobiles in that she failed to use or-
dinary care and caution under the circumstances. She 
voluntarily placed herself in a perilous position. The 
trial court, however, instructed the jury that plaintiff 
could walk on any 1part of the highway that she desired. 
'V e contend that instruction number 11 is erroneous and 
is not a correct statement of the law. This instruction 
reads as follows : 
"You are instructed that it is undisputed in-
this case that a sidewalk existed on the east side 
of Redwood Road, where the accident occurred, 
for the use of pedestrians. There is no law to 
~rohibit a pedestrian from walking at that loca-
tion, on the shoulder of a highway or on the edge 
of the highway, or in the center of either lane 
of said highway. The question in this case is not 
whether the plaintiff had a right to walk where 
she was walking, nor is it whether she was doing 
an unlawful act in walking in said place. The 
Court instructs the jury that the plaintiff was not 
walking on the sidewalk. The exact place where 
she was walking is a question for you to decide. 
When you decide that, the question then is, does 
a preponderance of the evidence show that the 
plaintiff failed to use due care for her own safety 
in walking where she was injured, that is, the care 
that an ordinary prudent woman, under the cir-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
5 
cumstances, would have used. If she did not use 
due care as aforesaid you are instructed to find 
for the defendant and against the plaintiff, no 
cause of action. '' 
The above instruction fails to specify vvhat the 
rights a pedestrian and motor vehicles using a highway 
are; and nowhere in the Court's instructions is there 
anything said as to the rights of motor vehicles on the 
highway. 
It is contended that :p1edestrians have a right to 
walk along the highway, subject to the predominating 
rights of ·motor vehicles, and that their rights are equal 
and each is obliged to act with due regard to the move-
ments of the other. Section 57-7-143, Utah Code Anno-
tated, 1943, reads as follows : 
. ''(a) Every pedestrian crossing a roadway at 
any point other than within a m-arked cross-walk 
or within an unmarked cross-walk at an intersec-
tion, shall yield the right of way to all vehicles 
upon the roadway." 
In Blashfield's Cyc .. of Automobile Law and Prac-
tice., Section. 1254, it is stated: 
"Pedestrians have a right to walk along the 
high-way, subject to the predominating right of 
motor vehicles.'' 
See Southeastern Telephone Co. vs. Payne, 
Ky. 69 S.W. 2d, 358; Legum vs. State (Md.), 173 
A. 565. 
''A pedestrian on the highway at night on 
whichever side he walks must exercise ordinary 
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care, in the situation he 1puts himself and under 
the circumstances ·surrounding him. The degree· 
of caution which constitutes ordinary care varies 
with the circumstances, and the greater the appar-
ent danger, the greater the degree of caution. 
''So one who uses the roadway without taking 
any precautions for his own safety, though he can 
see the lights of an automobile which strikes him 
long before it reaches him, is guilty of contribu-
tory negligence barring recovery for the injury 
received. The act of walking down the middle of 
a highway on a dark night in a populous city is 
one from which negligence may be inferred.'' 
In Am. Jur., Volume 5, P.age 608, it is stated: 
''The rights of pedestrians and motor vehicles 
on a public street are equal and each is obliged to 
act with due regard to the movements of the 
other." 
In Lindloff vs. Duecker, (Iowa); 251 N. W. 699. The 
decedent was walking in the center of the highway at 
night and was struck and fatally injured. He was clad 
in dark clothes and was struck by an on-coming automo-
bile at the time that an automobile from the rear passed 
him. The court in holding the pedestrian to be guilty 
of contributory negligence stated: 
''A pedestrian is at all times required to exer-
cise ordinary .care for his own safety. He may 
assume that persons ap,proaching him from either 
direction will not violate the law and will -exercise 
ordinary care in keeping .a lookout for him. This 
however, does not relieve him from the duty of 
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keeping a reasonable lookout, for his own safety, 
for vehicles ap,proaching from the rear as well as 
from the front. The pedestrians must exercise 
the ordinary care for his own safety which an 
ordinary prudent 1person would exercise to avoid 
danger ... 
~'We think it is a rna tter of common knowledge 
that it is a hazardous undertaking for a pedestrian 
clad in dark clothes, without light or lantern, to 
travel between center lines of a pavement, like the 
one in question, and deliberately maintains that 
position, with swiftly moving cars .approaching 
from both directions. He may have the right so 
to do, but if in the exercise of this right he is 
placing himself in a perilous position, he must 
take adequate precaution to guard against in-
jury." 
See Armbruster vs. Gray, (Iowa), 282 N. W. 343 
upholding the above rule. 
In Laffler vs. Laffer, et al., N. J. 142 A. 545, the 
court held that one walking down the middle of the 
highway on a dark night was precluded from recovery. 
In K rupien vs. Doolittle, (Conn.), 169 A. 268, plain-
tiff was struck while walking on the pavement in line of 
motor traffic and injured. The Court stated: 
"The plaintiff was conscious that he was walk-
ing in the line of motor traffic going southerly, 
and while he was within his legal rights in doing 
so, he was required to exercise a degree of care 
commensurate with the hazard thus assumed. One 
of the vital requirements thus imposed upon him 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
8 
was to observe the traffic in the line of which he 
was walking . . . 
"It was the duty of the plaintiff to exercise 
reasonable care, not only to avoid known dangers, 
but to discover those to which his conduct might 
expose him, and to be mindful of his sur-
roundings.'' 
See Tio V'S. Malter, (Mich.), 247 N. W. 772, holding 
that a pedestrian using highway at night must exercise 
reasonable care for his own safety. 
In Murphy vs. Granz, (N. H.), 17 A. 2d 449, ape-
destrian was killed while walking on a highway by de-
fendant's car traveling in the same direction. The night 
was dark, it was raining hard, the road was wet and 
consisted of black hard surface 24 feet wide. Judgment 
for plaintiff was set aside. The Court ·stating: 
''The :p1edestrian must exercise due care to pro-
tect himself and not to impede traffic unreason-
ably. The degree of such care varies of course 
with the circumstances of the particular case. 
''Courts generally agree that other things 
being equal, it is safer for one who walks along 
a highway to keep to the left side, where he can 
see perfectly the approach of cars coming in the 
opposite direction and usually avoid them easily 
by taking a step to the left . . . 
"When the pedestrian occupies the right-hand 
lane at night, the danger being enhanced to a high 
degree, he must take materially greater precau-
tions ... 
''Customs and common sense have always dic-
tated ... that pedestrians should walk along the 
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edge of a highway so that they might step aside 
for passing vehicles with the least danger to them-
selves and least obstruction to vehicular traffic ... 
"When the pedestrian is in the right lane and 
visibility is poor, the greater the risk; :p1r01por-
tionally greater care is demanded of the pedes-
trian ... 
''The decedent had a perfect right to be where 
he was, but since he chose to be there, he was 
bound as long as he remained to exercise the high 
degree of care his situation made necessary.'' 
Reid vs. Owens, 98 Utah 50, 93 P. 2d 680. 
In Mingus vs. Olsson, 201 P. 2d, 495; ______ Utah ______ , 
the Court stated: 
''The rights of pedestrians to the use of public 
streets are the same as those of motorists-neither 
greater nor less.'' 
The trial court's instruction number 11 is not a 
full statement of the law as it fails to point out to the 
jury the rights of a pedestrian when the highway is 
used by motor vehicles. No charge is given anyvvhere 
in the Court's instruction as to the rights of the de-
fendant to use the highway. Nothing is said about who 
should yield the right of way when a vehicle approaches 
a pedestrian. 
Further, the pJaintiff being guilty of contributory 
negligence, the defendant's motion for a directed verdict 
should have been granted. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
10 
- p (>; .Ht ;1.-
The. ·Court erred m gi.ving to the Jury the Court's 
instr·uction No. 12 .. 
The Trial Court's instruction No. 12 reads as fol-
lows: 
"You are instructed that in determining 
whether or not the plaintiff was contributorily 
negligent in failing to act for her s·afety, as an 
ordinarily reasonable and prudent p·erson would 
have .acted, you may take into consideration the 
following factors: the fear which plaintiff may 
have had walking along the sidewalk; the fear 
which plaintiff may have had for her safety in 
leaving the highway to walk in unlighted areas; 
the fear which plaintiff may have had in crossing 
a wide, well-traveled highway to reach the other 
side ; the personal inconvenience involved to the 
plaintiff in crossing over 25 feet of muddy terrain 
to get to the sidewalk; the length of the distance 
which plaintiff anticipated walking along the right 
side of Redwood R.oad; evidence that plaintiff 
anticipated being picked up on the right side of 
Redwood Road by the mother of her friend.'' 
The foregoing instruction is prejudicial and con-
fusing and assumes as true certain facts stated therein. 
The Plaintiff walked down the highway for one reason, 
not for several reasons as the Court assumes in the 
foregoing instruction. The instruction is argumentative 
and an invasion on the part of the Court of the province 
of the jury and erroneous under our practice. It prac-
tically vindicates the plaintiff from contributory negli-
gence by directing to the jury excuses for plaintiff's 
carelessness. 
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53 Am. Jur., P. 477; Nelson vs. Lott, 17 P. 2d 
272, 81 Utah 265; Marti V'S. Americ:an Smelting & 
Refin.ing ·Co., 63 P. 184, 23 Utah 52. 
- ;P4J ;• N-t :J -
The Court erre.d in refusing t.a give Defendant's re-
quested instructions No. 4, 5, .and 6.) 
The defendant requested the following instructions 
which were refused by the trial Court : 
''DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED 
INSTRUCTION NUMBER 4 
"You are further instructed that it is a uni-
versal rule of law that all persons must exercise 
ordinary care when their conduct may affect any 
other rperson, or when they may be affected by 
the conduct of any other ~person. It is as much 
the duty of a person to exercise ordinary care for 
his own safety and protection as it is his duty to 
exercise ordinary care with respect to the safety 
and protection of other"s. Thus in the case on 
trial it was as much the duty of the plaintiff to 
exercise ordinary care for her own safety and 
protection as it was the duty of the defendant to 
exercise such care with respect to the plaintiff's 
s-afety and protection.'' 
''DEFE·NDANT'S REQUESTED 
INSTRUCTION NUMBER 5 
''You are instructed that a pedestrian using the 
highway is required to use such reasonable care, 
circumspection, prudence and discretion as the 
circumstances require, and an increase of care is 
required of him -vvhere there is an increase of 
danger, and if you find from the evidence in this 
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case that the plaintiff was traveling on the por-
tion of the highway generally used by motor 
vehicles to drive their automobiles thereon. and 
that such act up·on the part of the 'Plaintiff was 
not reasonable and .p,rudent under the circum-
stances for the safety and protection of herself, 
then you are instructed to find in favor of the de-
fendant and against the plaintiff." 
''DEFENDAN·T'S REQUESTED 
INSTRUC·TION NUMBER 6 
''You are instructed that it is undisputed in 
this case that a sidewalk existed on the east side 
of said highway where the accident occurred, 
solely for the purpose and use of 'Pedestrians. 
If, therefore, you find from the evidence in this 
case that by reason of the weather, darkness 
and other hazards then and there existing that 
a reasonable and prudent person would not walk 
on the highway but would use the sidewalk to 
travel thereon and the plain tiff failed to do so, 
then you are instructed to find in favor of the 
defendant and against the :plaintiff." 
In 53 Am. Jur., paragraph 626, page 487, it is stated: 
"Each party to an action is entitled to have 
the jury instructed with reference to his theory 
of the case, where such theory is supported by 
competent evidence and the instruction is 'Prop-
erly requested, and this is true although such 
theory may be controverted by evidence of the 
op:posing party.'' 
As already pointed out, the trial court failed to in-
struct the jury as to the rights of motor vehicles upon 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
13 
the highway and the rights of the defendant in this case 
in driYing his automobile on the highway. The cases 
cited in this brief hold that it is the duty of a person 
to exercise ordinary care for his own safety and pro-
tection and when circumstances require it, there is an 
increase of care when there is an increase of danger, 
and certainly in this case for the !plaintiff to walk 
down in the middle of the lane while it was raining and 
dark, was an act on her vart wherein she placed her-
self in a dangerous position. The defendant was entitled 
to have these matters submitted to the jury and defend-
ant's requested instructions numbered 4, 5, and 6 should 
have been given by the trial court to the jury. The de-
fendant was entitled . to have the theory of his defense 
submitted to the jury and the refusal on the part of the 
trial court was error. 
We respectfully submit that the judgment in favor 
of the plaintiff should be reversed and a new trial 
granted. 
Respectfully submitted, 
H. G. METOS, 
Attorney for Appelkunt. 
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